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Cruise Contracts, Public Policy, and 
Foreign Forum Selection Clauses 
JOHN F. COYLE* 
A cruise ship contract is the prototypical contract of 
adhesion. The passenger is presented with the contract on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis. If she refuses to sign, the ship sails 
without her. To ensure that cruise companies do not draft 
one-sided contracts that are unfair to passengers, Congress 
has enacted a number of statutes that regulate these 
agreements. One such statute is 46 U.S.C. § 30509. This law 
stipulates that any contract provision that limits the liability 
of the cruise company for personal injury or death is void as 
against public policy if the ship stops at a U.S. port. 
In recent years, cruise companies have sought to develop 
a workaround to this rule for non-U.S. residents. The 
workaround involves (1) a foreign forum selection clause, 
and (2) a foreign choice-of-law clause. When a suit is filed 
against the cruise company in U.S. court, the company will 
invoke the foreign forum selection clause and ask for the 
case to be dismissed. When the case is refiled in the foreign 
court, the cruise company will then argue that the choice-of-
law clause compels the application of the Athens 
Convention, an international treaty that caps the liability of 
cruise companies in negligence cases. In this way, the 
companies seek to use forum selection clauses and choice-
of-law clauses in tandem to achieve a goal—limting their 
tort liability to passengers via contract—that would 
ordinarily be prohibited by 46 U.S.C. § 30509. 
 
 *  Reef C. Ivey II Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Car-
olina at Chapel Hill. Many thanks to Martin Davies, Bill Dodge, and Kate Lewins 
for their comments on an earlier draft of this Article. Thanks to Carleigh Zeman 
for excellent research assistance. 
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This workaround should not work. Indeed, there are 
dozens of cases where U.S. courts have refused to enforce 
forum selection clauses in analogous situations. In 2012, 
however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
expressly blessed the use of the workaround in cruise ship 
contracts. This Article first critiques this Eleventh Circuit 
decision and identifies its many shortcomings. It then draws 
upon analogous cases from other areas of U.S. law to 
propose a new analytical framework for evaluating when the 
courts should and should not enforce foreign forum selection 
clauses in cruise ship contracts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There are relatively few federal statutes that directly regulate the 
terms of contracts between private actors. One such statute is 46 
U.S.C. § 30509.1 That statute prohibits cruise companies from writ-
ing provisions into their passenger contracts that limit the com-
pany’s liability for personal injury or death incurred on cruises that 
stop at a U.S. port.2 The policy goal underlying this statute is 
straightforward. A cruise contract is the prototypical contract of ad-
hesion.3 Absent the constraints imposed by the statute, a cruise com-
pany could write language into its passenger contracts absolving the 
company from liability for passenger injuries even when the com-
pany was at fault.4 The statute clearly states that such provisions are 
void as against U.S. public policy and directs courts not to give them 
any effect.5 
Over the past decade, cruise companies have worked diligently 
to develop a workaround to this law for non-U.S. residents. First, 
the companies write choice-of-law clauses selecting the law of the 
passenger’s home country into their passenger contracts.6 In many 
cases, the enforcement of such clauses will result in the application 
of the Athens Convention, a multilateral treaty which caps the lia-
bility of cruise ship companies in tort cases.7 When the Athens Con-
vention applies, an injured cruise ship passenger generally cannot 
 
 1 46 U.S.C. § 30509(a) (“(1) In general. The owner, master, manager, or 
agent of a vessel transporting passengers between ports in the United States, or 
between a port in the United States and a port in a foreign country, may not include 
in a regulation or contract a provision limiting—(A) the liability of the owner, 
master, or agent for personal injury or death caused by the negligence or fault of 
the owner or the owner’s employees or agents; or (B) the right of a claimant for 
personal injury or death to a trial by court of competent jurisdiction. (2) Voidness. 
A provision described in paragraph (1) is void.”). 
 2 See Robert D. Peltz, The Athens Convention Revisited, 43 J. MAR. L. & 
COM. 491, 491 (2012) (discussing application of section 30509 to the Athens Con-
vention when the ship does not visit a U.S. port). 
 3 See id. at 507. 
 4 See id. at 496. 
 5 See 46 U.S.C. § 30509(a). 
 6 See, e.g., Peltz, supra note 2, at 515 (observing that cruise companies write 
choice-of-law clauses into their contracts). 
 7 See id. at 492, 515. 
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recover more than approximately $66,000 in a tort suit.8 In this man-
ner, the cruise companies seek to use a choice-of-law clause to make 
an end run around the statutory prohibition on liability caps imposed 
by U.S. law. 
The problem with this strategy, of course, is that there is no guar-
antee that a U.S. court will enforce a choice-of-law clause on these 
facts. To get around this problem, the cruise companies have added 
a second provision to their standard-form passenger contracts. This 
second provision is a forum selection clause that selects the courts 
of the foreign passenger’s home country.9 The companies believe 
(rightly) that the courts of the passenger’s home country are far more 
likely to enforce a choice-of-law clause that will lead to the applica-
tion of their own law—and the Athens Convention—than a court in 
the United States.10 The forum selection clause leads to the enforce-
ment of the choice-of-law clause. The choice-of-law clause leads to 
the Athens Convention. The Athens Convention leads to the impo-
sition of liability caps. 
When a foreign passenger sues a cruise company in a U.S. court, 
therefore, the company will ask the court to enforce the foreign fo-
rum selection clause.11 In the overwhelming majority of cases, this 
request will be granted. When the suit is later filed in the courts of 
 
 8 The Athens Convention limits the liability of a cruise company to its pas-
sengers to 46,666 Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). As of March 26, 2021, 46,666 
SDRs was equal to roughly $66,000. For countries that have ratified the 2002 
Protocol to the Athens Convention, the liability of a cruise company is capped at 
400,000 SDRs (roughly $568,000). See generally Jeremy Epstein et al., Are You 
Worth Only 46,666 SDRs if You Die or Are Injured When Cruising Abroad?, 28 
LA. ADVOCS. 21, 23–25 (2013) (discussing practical consequences that flow from 
these limits on liability); Robert D. Peltz & Vincent J. Warger, Amendments to 
Athens’ Convention Threaten US Maritime Law, 2001 INT’L TRAVEL L.J. 170, 
170 (2001). 
 9 See Peltz, supra note 2, at 494. 
 10 Once a country ratifies the Athens Convention, the treaty becomes a part 
of that country’s law. If the cruise contract falls within the scope of Article 2 of 
the Convention—because the ship flies the flag of a party state, the contract was 
entered in a party state, or the place of departure or destination is a party state—
then the Convention must be applied by the ratifying country’s courts irrespective 
of any choice-of-law clause in the contract. See Angelica L. Boutwell, The Athens 
Convention and Limitation of Liability in U.S. Federal Courts: While Communi-
cation Is Key, Some Things Are Better Left Unsaid, 43 U. MIA. INTER-AMERICAN 
L. REV. 523, 524–27 (2012). 
 11 See id. 
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the foreign nation, the company will ask the foreign court to enforce 
the choice-of-law clause.12 In the overwhelming majority of cases, 
again, this request will be granted and the liability limitations set 
forth in the Athens Convention will be applied.13 In this manner, the 
cruise companies seek to use choice-of-law clauses and forum se-
lection clauses in tandem to defang the express prohibition on lia-
bility limitations set forth in section 30509.14 
As a general rule, U.S. courts do not permit private actors to use 
a combination of choice-of-law and forum selection clauses to pro-
duce litigation outcomes that are contrary to public policy.15 In Es-
tate of Myhra v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., however, the Elev-
enth Circuit did precisely that.16 The Myhra court was asked to en-
force a forum selection clause requiring a lawsuit by an English pas-
senger against a cruise company to be brought in England.17 The 
plaintiff argued that the English forum selection clause was unen-
forceable because its enforcement would lead to the enforcement of 
the choice-of-law clause and, ultimately, to the liability limitations 
in the Athens Convention.18 The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argu-
ment, ruled in favor of the defendant, and dismissed the case in favor 
of an English forum.19 In so doing, it gave its stamp of approval to 
the contractual workaround to section 30509 described above. 
This Article explains why the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in 
Myhra is flawed. It first reviews the relevant case law from the U.S. 
Supreme Court relating to the enforceability of forum selection 
clauses. It then discusses a long string of cases in which U.S. courts 
have refused to enforce forum selection clauses when the effect 
would be to evade mandatory laws. This Article next evaluates and 
critiques the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Myhra against the back-
drop of these other cases. It shows that the Myhra decision cites to 
virtually none of the relevant precedents and reaches an outcome 
that is inconsistent with U.S. public policy. It then shows that 
 
 12 See id. 
 13 See id. 
 14 See 46 U.S.C. § 30509(a). 
 15 See infra Part III. 
 16 See Estate of Myhra v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1233, 
1246–47 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 17 See id. at 1235–36. 
 18 See id. at 1237–39. 
 19 See id. at 1246–47; see also infra Part IV. 
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subsequent Eleventh Circuit cases grappling with this issue are in 
many respects even more problematic than Myhra. The Article con-
cludes by calling upon the Eleventh Circuit to adopt a new frame-
work for evaluating the enforceability of foreign forum selection 
clauses in cruise ship contracts in cases implicating the Athens Con-
vention. 
I. PUBLIC POLICY AND FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES 
When a court in the United States is called upon to determine 
whether an outbound forum selection clause is enforceable, it will 
generally look first to the test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in 1972 in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.20 In that case, the 
Court identified three reasons why a forum selection clause might 
be unenforceable.21 First, the Court stated that a clause should not 
be enforced if it was unreasonable.22 Second, the Court stated that a 
clause should not be enforced if it was subject to a contract defense 
such as fraud.23 Third, the Court stated that a clause should not be 
given effect if it was contrary to public policy.24 Specifically, the 
Court held that “[a] contractual choice-of-forum clause should be 
held unenforceable if enforcement would contravene a strong public 
policy of the forum in which suit is brought, whether declared by 
statute or by judicial decision.”25 
Nineteen years later, the Court provided some additional guid-
ance as to when a forum selection clause was unenforceable on pub-
lic policy grounds in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute.26 The 
Court was called upon to decide whether enforcing a forum selection 
 
 20 See John F. Coyle & Katherine C. Richardson, Enforcing Outbound Forum 
Selection Clauses in State Court, 96 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 
3–4) (on file with author). “An outbound forum selection clause is a contractual 
provision stipulating that any litigation between the parties must occur in a forum 
other than the one in which the suit was filed.” Id. at 7. Any forum selection clause 
selecting a foreign court will be treated as an outbound clause when suit is filed 
in the United States. 
 21 See Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15–17 (1972). 
 22 See id. at 10, 15. 
 23 See id. at 15. 
 24 See id. 
 25 Id. at 15. 
 26 See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595–96 (1991). 
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clause requiring a resident of Washington to bring suit against a 
cruise line in Florida contravened the strong public policy of the 
United States.27 The Court concluded that requiring the plaintiff to 
travel across the country to Florida to sue did not “weaken” her abil-
ity to bring a lawsuit in a court of competent jurisdiction within the 
meaning of the relevant statute.28 Accordingly, the Court held the 
forum selection clause was enforceable.29 The Court in Carnival 
Cruise did not consider—because it had no reason to consider—
what would happen if a forum selection clause required a plaintiff 
to bring suit in a court outside of the United States. Nor did it con-
sider what would happen if the contract contained a choice-of-law 
clause selecting the law of a non-U.S. jurisdiction. 
In 2013, the Court revisited the topic of forum selection clauses 
in Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. United States District 
Court.30 In this case, the Court identified the proper procedural 
mechanism for enforcing forum selection clauses in federal court.31 
When a forum selection clause calls for the case to be resolved by a 
different federal court, the Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) gov-
erns the issue.32 When the forum selection clause names a state court 
or a foreign court, by contrast, the Court held that the motion to dis-
miss should be evaluated through the doctrine of forum non conven-
iens.33 Significantly, nothing in Atlantic Marine addresses the 
threshold question of whether a forum selection clause is enforcea-
ble; the Court expressly stated that its “analysis presupposes a con-
tractually valid forum-selection clause.”34 The decision leaves un-
touched the analytical framework for determining whether a forum 
 
 27 See id. at 587–90. 
 28 Id. at 595–96; see also 46 U.S.C. app. § 183c (“It shall be unlawful for 
the . . . owner of any vessel transporting passengers . . . to insert in any . . . con-
tract, or agreement any provision or limitation . . . purporting in such event to 
lessen, weaken, or avoid the right of any claimant to a trial by court of competent 
jurisdiction on the question of liability for such loss or injury, or the measure of 
damages therefor. All such provisions or limitations contained in any such rule, 
regulation, contract, or agreement are hereby declared to be against public policy 
and shall be null and void and of no effect.”). 
 29 See Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 595–97. 
 30 See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Distr. Ct., 571 U.S. 49, 52–54 (2013). 
 31 See id. at 59. 
 32 Id. at 59. 
 33 Id. at 60. 
 34 Id. at 62 n.5. 
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selection clause is enforceable set forth in The Bremen and Carnival 
Cruise. Under both of these cases, a forum selection clause that is 
contrary to public policy as declared in a statute is unenforceable. 
II. FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES AND THE LOGIC OF ANTI-
WAIVER 
An anti-waiver statute is a law which states that a particular right 
may not be waived by contract.35 Such provisions commonly appear 
in laws intended to protect consumers.36 If consumer protection laws 
lacked an anti-waiver statute, then it would be a simple matter for 
companies who interact with consumers to evade such laws. They 
would simply require consumers to sign agreements waiving any 
and all rights conferred by the laws at the time of purchase. To avoid 
this outcome, legislatures typically include an anti-waiver statute in 
their consumer protection legislation declaring that the rights con-
ferred by the statute may not be waived.37 
There are, however, other ways by which a company may seek 
to evade a given state’s consumer protection laws. Instead of writing 
an express waiver into the contract, the company may choose in-
stead to write a choice-of-law clause into that agreement selecting 
the law of a state that lacks a consumer protection statute. If the 
choice-of-law clause is enforced, then the choice-of-law clause will 
operate in precisely the same way as an express waiver and the con-
sumer will be deprived of her rights under the enacting state’s con-
sumer protection laws. Accordingly, most courts will refuse to en-
force choice-of-law clauses selecting a jurisdiction whose law lacks 
equivalent legal protections to the jurisdiction that enacted the anti-
waiver statute.38 In the view of these courts, a company may not use 
a choice-of-law clause indirectly to obtain an outcome that it could 
not realize through an express waiver in the agreement.39 
 
 35 Coyle & Richardson, supra note 20, at 27. 
 36 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN § 45.50.542 (West 2020) (“A waiver by a 
consumer of the provisions of [this Act] is contrary to public policy and is unen-
forceable and void.”). 
 37 See, e.g., id. 
 38 See Coyle & Richardson, supra note 20, at 27–28. 
 39 See id. at 27. 
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When a company writes both a choice-of-law clause and a forum 
selection clause into its agreement with a consumer, the situation 
becomes still more complicated. One can easily imagine a scenario 
where a choice-of-law clause would not be enforced in the courts in 
State A but would be enforced in the courts of State B. In this sce-
nario, the decision whether to enforce the forum selection clause se-
lecting the courts of State B becomes a de facto decision as to 
whether to enforce the choice-of-law clause.40 Where a contract con-
tains both a choice-of-law and a forum selection clause, therefore, a 
court may decline to give effect to the forum selection clause if it 
believes that its enforcement will lead to the enforcement of the 
choice-of-law clause and, ultimately, to the waiver of non-waivable 
rights. 
In 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly endorsed this logic 
in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.41 In 
that case, the Court was asked to decide whether “the pervasive pub-
lic interest in enforcement of the antitrust laws, and the nature of the 
claims that arise in such cases, combine to make . . . antitrust 
claims . . . inappropriate for arbitration.”42 In concluding that anti-
trust claims were arbitrable—and that the dispute must be resolved 
by arbitration in Japan—the Court specifically noted that the Japa-
nese arbitrators would be applying U.S. antitrust law to resolve the 
issue.43 There was no danger, in other words, that a choice-of-law 
clause would operate to deprive the plaintiffs of the antitrust protec-
tions conferred by U.S. law. 
The Court specifically noted, however, that a different result 
would obtain if the enforcement of a forum selection clause would 
ultimately result in the application of foreign antitrust law.44 As the 
Court explained, “[I]n the event the choice-of-forum and choice-of-
 
 40 If the court enforces the forum selection clause, the case will be heard by 
the courts of State A. These courts will enforce the choice-of-law clause and this 
action will result in the waiver of non-waivable rights. If the court refuses to en-
force the forum selection clause, the case will be heard by the courts of State B. 
These courts will refuse to enforce the choice-of-law clause and this action will 
not result in the waiver of any non-waivable rights. 
 41 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
624–28 (1985). 
 42 Id. at 629. 
 43 See id. at 637 n.19. 
 44 See id. 
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law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s 
right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would 
have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public 
policy.”45 An attempt to use a choice-of-law clause and forum selec-
tion clause to effectuate the waiver of non-waivable rights conferred 
by U.S. antitrust law was, in the Court’s view, contrary to U.S. pub-
lic policy.46 In such cases, it held that the lower courts should decline 
to give effect to a forum selection clause in the first instance. 
III. ANALOGOUS CASE LAW 
In the thirty-five years since Mitsubishi was decided, U.S. courts 
have repeatedly invoked the logic of anti-waiver to strike down fo-
rum selection clauses on the grounds that their enforcement will 
eventually lead to the application of law that is contrary to the public 
policy of the forum. This Part below provides a brief overview of 
these cases. 
A. California Labor Law 
The California state courts have invoked the logic of anti-waiver 
when refusing to enforce forum selection clauses on a number of 
occasions. These state cases are not binding on federal courts. The 
reasoning underlying these decisions, however, is fully consistent 
with the logic of anti-waiver. 
In Verdugo v. Alliantgroup, L.P., for example, a California 
worker sued her Texas-based employer in California state court for 
violating the California Labor Code.47 The Texas defendant sought 
to stay or dismiss the action on the grounds that the plaintiff’s em-
ployment agreement with the defendant contained an exclusive fo-
rum selection clause choosing Texas.48 The contract also contained 
a Texas choice-of-law clause.49 In evaluating whether the forum 
 
 45 Id. (emphasis added). 
 46 See Joseph R. Brubaker & Michael P. Daly, Twenty-Five Years of the 
“Prospective Waiver” Doctrine in International Dispute Resolution: Mitsubishi’s 
Footnote Nineteen Comes to Life in the Eleventh Circuit, 64 U. MIA. L. REV. 1233, 
1234 (2010). 
 47 See Verdugo v. Alliantgroup, L.P, 187 Cal. Rptr. 3d 613, 626 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2015). 
 48 See id. at 616–17. 
 49 See id. at 616. 
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selection clause was enforceable, the court noted that the California 
Labor Code contained an anti-waiver provision which stated that 
“no provision of this article can in any way be contravened or set 
aside by a private agreement . . . whether written, oral, or im-
plied.”50 
In light of this statutory language, the court announced that the 
“California courts will refuse to defer to the selected forum if to do 
so would substantially diminish the rights of California residents in 
a way that violates our state’s public policy.”51 The key inquiry, the 
court held, was whether a court in the chosen state—Texas—would 
apply a law that was as protective of the plaintiff’s rights as the law 
of California.52 In the court’s words: 
[A] defendant seeking to enforce a mandatory forum 
selection clause bears the burden to show enforce-
ment will not in any way diminish the plaintiff’s un-
waivable statutory rights. By definition, this showing 
requires the defendant to compare the plaintiff’s 
rights if the clause is not enforced and the plaintiff’s 
rights if the clause is enforced. Indeed, a defendant 
can meet its burden only by showing the foreign fo-
rum provides the same or greater rights than Cali-
fornia, or the foreign forum will apply California law 
on the claims at issue.53 
Since the defendant in Verdugo could not show that the Texas 
court would provide the plaintiff with the same or greater rights as 
set forth in the California Labor Code, the court held that the forum 
selection clause selecting Texas was not enforceable.54 
 
 50 Id. at 622. 
 51 Id. at 618. 
 52 See id.; see also Kan. City Grill Cleaners, LLC v. BBQ Cleaner, LLC, 454 
P.3d 608, 615 (Kan. Ct. App. 2019) (“The potential likelihood that an agreed-to 
forum would apply an accompanying choice-of-law provision favoring its law and 
disfavoring the protections in the KCPA bolsters our conclusion that the forum-
selection clause is unenforceable in this case.”). 
 53 Verdugo, 187 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 626 (emphasis added). 
 54 See id. at 630; see also Am. Online, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
699, 702 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (“Enforcement of the contractual forum selection 
and choice of law clauses would be the functional equivalent of a contractual 
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B. Federal Securities Laws 
The federal courts have utilized a similar analytical framework 
to assess whether the anti-waiver provisions in the federal securities 
laws invalidate a forum selection clause choosing the courts in an-
other country.55 In a series of cases involving Lloyd’s of London, 
the lower federal courts were called upon to decide whether a forum 
selection clause selecting England was invalid because its enforce-
ment would result in the application of English securities law.56 The 
agreements in question also contained choice-of-law clauses select-
ing English law.57 
In analyzing this question, the federal circuit courts of appeals 
recognized that a forum selection clause selecting England is en-
forceable only if English law will permit plaintiffs to vindicate their 
 
waiver of the consumer protections under the CLRA and, thus, is prohibited under 
California law.”); Wimsatt v. Beverly Hills Weight Loss Clinics Int’l, Inc., 38 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 612, 618 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (“Given California’s inability to guar-
antee application of its Franchise Investment Law in the contract forum, its courts 
must necessarily do the next best thing. In determining the ‘validity and enforce-
ability’ of forum selection provisions in franchise agreements, its courts must put 
the burden on the franchisor to show that litigation in the contract forum will not 
diminish in any way the substantive rights afforded California franchisees under 
California law.”); Hall v. Super. Ct., 197 Cal. Rptr. 757, 762 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) 
(“California’s policy to protect securities investors, without more, would probably 
justify denial of enforcement of the choice of forum provision, although a failure 
to do so might not constitute an abuse of discretion; but section 25701, which 
renders void any provision purporting to waive or evade the Corporate Securities 
Law, removes that discretion and compels denial of enforcement.”). But see 
Campbell v. Marriott Ownership Resorts Inc., No. E064139, 2016 WL 817876, at 
*2–4 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2016) (concluding that California legislation relating 
to time shares did not contain nonwaivable rights and therefore did not bar the 
enforcement of the clause). 
 55 See 15 U.S.C. § 77n (“Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any 
person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this sub-
chapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void.”); see 
also 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (“Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any per-
son to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or reg-
ulation thereunder, or of any rule of a self-regulatory organization, shall be 
void.”). 
 56 See Darrell Hall, No Way Out: An Argument Against Permitting Parties to 
Opt Out of U.S. Securities Laws in International Transactions, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 
57, 81–83 (1997). 
 57 See id. 
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substantive rights in a manner consistent with the U.S. securities 
laws.58 In the words of the Second Circuit: 
We believe that if the [plaintiffs] were able to show 
that available remedies in England are insufficient to 
deter British issuers from exploiting American inves-
tors through fraud, misrepresentation or inadequate 
disclosure, we would not hesitate to condemn the 
choice of law, forum selection and arbitration clauses 
as against public policy.59 
In the cases involving Lloyd’s, every federal court of appeal to 
consider the issue concluded that the English securities laws do pro-
vide sufficient protections to U.S. investors. Accordingly, these 
courts have enforced forum selection clauses selecting the English 
courts.60 If a plaintiff was able to show that the securities laws of 
another nation—India, for example, or Brazil—did not provide 
equivalent protections to U.S. investors, however, then the logic of 
the above decisions makes clear that the foreign forum selection 
clause would be unenforceable.61 
 
 58 See, e.g., Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d 1353, 1364–65 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 59 Id. at 1365. 
 60 See Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 148 F.3d 1285, 1298 (11th Cir. 
1998); see also Haynsworth v. The Corp., 121 F.3d 956, 962 (5th Cir. 1997); Al-
len v. Lloyd’s of London, 94 F.3d 923, 928 (4th Cir. 1996); Shell v. R.W. Sturge, 
Ltd., 55 F.3d 1227, 1229–30 (6th Cir. 1995); Bonny v. Soc’y of Lloyd’s, 3 F.3d 
156, 160 (7th Cir. 1993); Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 
953, 958 (10th Cir. 1992). 
 61 There are a number of state cases that have adopted the same basic ap-
proach to the inquiry. See Moon v. CSA-Credit Sols. of Am., Inc., 696 S.E.2d 
486, 488 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (“[I]f enforced, the contract’s forum selection and 
choice of law provisions requiring the Moons to bring their action before a Texas 
court applying Texas law would operate in tandem to deprive them of specific 
statutory protections . . . . Because this would violate Georgia’s public policy es-
tablished in OCGA § 18-5-1 et seq. relating to debt adjustment agreements and 
encourage debt adjustment practices in Georgia contrary to that policy, the forum 
selection and choice of law provisions in the contract are invalid and unenforcea-
ble.”); Pepe v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 750 A.2d 1167, 1168–69 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
2000) (anti-waiver provision in Connecticut Franchise Law precluded enforce-
ment of forum selection clause); Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa, 14 A.3d 678, 680, 
685–86 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011) (anti-waiver provision in Maryland Workers 
Compensation Law precluded enforcement of forum selection clause); Maher & 
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C. Federal Civil Rights Statutes 
U.S. courts have used a similar analytical framework to deter-
mine whether foreign forum selection clauses may be enforced 
when the plaintiff asserts a claim under federal civil rights laws. The 
Supreme Court has long recognized that a person cannot preemp-
tively waive the rights conferred by these laws.62 To evaluate the 
validity of a foreign forum selection clause in civil rights cases, the 
courts have held that they must first analyze whether the foreign law 
offers protections that are similar to those provided under U.S. civil 
rights law.63 
In Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, the Second Circuit undertook just 
such an analysis.64 A terminated employee sued his former employer 
in federal court in New York, arguing that his termination violated 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).65 The employer 
moved to dismiss the suit on the basis that the employment agree-
ment between the plaintiff and the defendant contained an exclusive 
forum selection clause selecting the English courts.66 The agreement 
also contained a choice-of-law clause selecting English law.67 In 
weighing whether the forum selection clause was enforceable, the 
 
Assocs. v. Quality Cabinets, 640 N.E.2d 1000, 1005 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (“The 
only reasonable interpretation of section 2 of the [Illinois Sales Representative 
Act] is that the legislature was announcing fundamental public policy when it de-
cided that any contract purporting to waive any provisions of the Act is void. 
Therefore, we void the forum-selection clause of the agreement in this matter.”). 
Again, these state cases are not binding on federal courts. The logic underlying 
these decisions, however, is consistent with the approach adopted by the federal 
courts. 
 62 See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 273 (2009) (stating that a 
“substantive waiver of federally protected civil rights will not be upheld”); Alex-
ander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51, (1974) (“[T]here can be no pro-
spective waiver of an employee’s rights under Title VII.”); see also Acharya v. 
Microsoft Corp., 354 P.3d 908, 914 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (“Under Washington 
law, the right to be free from discrimination is nonnegotiable and cannot be 
waived in contract. But, under the forum selection clause and the choice of law 
provision, Acharya’s [Washington Law Against Discrimination] claim would not 
be cognizable. Preventing a Washington plaintiff from enforcing Washington law 
is contrary to public policy.”). 
 63 See Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 229 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 64 See id. 
 65 See id. at 214. 
 66 See id. 
 67 See id. 
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Second Circuit observed that the essential question was whether 
English law provided protections to employees that were equivalent 
to those in the ADA.68 As the court explained: “We would hesitate 
to enforce a forum selection clause if the party resisting enforcement 
demonstrated that the foreign forum’s anti-discrimination law was 
insufficient to deter employers from violating the . . . civil rights of 
individuals with disabilities.”69 
After reviewing the substantive content of English anti-discrim-
ination law, the court concluded that English law contained protec-
tions that were broadly similar to those in U.S. law.70 Indeed, the 
court found that English law was actually more favorable to the 
plaintiff in some respects.71 Accordingly, the court held that there 
was no public policy rationale for refusing to enforce the English 
forum selection clause.72 If the court had concluded that English law 
provided less robust protections than U.S. law, however, there can 
be little doubt that it would have declined to enforce the forum se-
lection clause requiring the suit to be brought in England. 
 
 68 See id. at 229. 
 69 Id. 
 70 See id. 
 71 See id. (stating “The only purported inadequacies with English anti-dis-
crimination law that [plaintiff] identifies are its shorter statute of limitations pe-
riod, the unavailability of prevailing party attorney’s fees, and the cost of proceed-
ing in the U.K.,” and holding that “[u]nlike U.S. federal law, English anti-discrim-
ination law allows for claims based on sexual orientation.”). 
 72 See id.; see also Tetra Tech Tesoro, Inc. v. JAAAT Tech. Servs., 789 
S.E.2d 310, 316 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016) (“Tesoro has failed to carry its burden to 
show that Virginia law is materially different from, much less in conflict with, 
that of Georgia on the legal points raised by Tesoro’s complaint. Tesoro, there-
fore, has wholly failed to make a strong case . . . that enforcement of the parties’ 
forum selection clauses that Tesoro drafted are likely to produce a result that vio-
lates a public policy of Georgia because the same or similar remedies are not 
available in Virginia.”); see also Crump Ins. Servs. v. All Risks, Ltd., 727 S.E.2d 
131, 134 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (“The appellants here have not shown that . . . pro-
ceedings in a Maryland court would likely produce a result that offends the public 
policy of Georgia. Absent such a showing, no compelling reason appears to avoid 
the forum-selection clause.”); Holeman v. Nat’l Bus. Inst., 94 S.W.3d 91, 99 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 2002) (“Because Holeman has made no effort to show that a Georgia 
court would not apply Texas law, Holeman has failed to demonstrate how en-
forcement of the forum selection clause would subvert Texas public policy.”). 
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D. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 
In 1936, Congress enacted section 3(8) of the Carriage of Goods 
by Sea Act (“COGSA”).73 This provision states: 
Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of 
carriage relieving the carrier or the ship from liability 
for loss or damage to or in connection with the goods, 
arising from negligence, fault, or failure in the duties 
and obligations provided in this section, or lessening 
such liability otherwise than as provided in this Act, 
shall be null and void and of no effect.74 
This statement of public policy is focused on contract provisions that 
relieve or lessen a carrier’s liability when goods entrusted to it are 
lost or damaged.75 Although this anti-waiver statute is different from 
those discussed above in several respects, the courts use the same 
basic analytical framework to determine whether a forum selection 
clause should be enforced in cases implicating the statute.76 
In Nippon Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. M/V Spring Wave, 
for example, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Lou-
isiana cited section 3(8) in refusing to enforce a forum selection 
 
 73 46 U.S.C. § 30701. 
 74 Id. 
 75 See Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 540–
41 (1995). 
 76 See id. In Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer, the Supreme 
Court considered the question of whether a foreign arbitration clause was unen-
forceable because it would lead to the application of foreign law and subsequently 
to a “lessening” of liability under section 3(8). Id. at 530–31. The Court ultimately 
deemed this question “premature” and declined to offer a definitive answer to the 
question. Id. at 540. The Court’s reasoning in Sky Reefer, however, suggests that 
there are important differences between foreign arbitration clauses and foreign 
forum selection clauses when it comes to analyzing this question. See Cent. Nat’l-
Gottesman, Inc. v. M.V. “Gertrude Oldendorff,” 204 F. Supp. 2d 675, 682 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“An integral component of the Court’s reasoning in SKY 
REEFER was that there existed a subsequent opportunity for the district court to 
review the foreign court’s decision to ensure that it comported with the interest in 
enforcement of the laws in the [United States] and was not violative of public 
policy. Absent this opportunity for review, it is readily apparent that the Court 
would have had a much harder time enforcing the forum selection [arbitration] 
clause and transferring the case to Japan.”). 
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clause selecting the law and courts of Japan.77 In support of this de-
cision, the court noted that there was a strong possibility that a Jap-
anese court would apply Japanese law to enforce one of several pro-
visions in the contract that would lessen the carrier’s liability in con-
travention of U.S. public policy.78 Accordingly, it declined to en-
force the forum selection clause.79 In Central National-Gottesman, 
Inc. v. M.V. “Gertrude Oldendorff”, the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York refused to enforce a forum selection 
clause selecting the law and courts of England because the contract 
contained an exculpatory clause insulating parties other than the 
shipowner from liability that was enforceable under English law.80 
The court noted that there was a strong possibility that the English 
courts applying English law would adopt a narrower definition of 
the word “carrier” than the one followed by the courts in New 
York.81 This fact, in the court’s view, justified its decision not to 
enforce the forum selection clause.82 And in Y-Tex Corp. v. Schen-
ker, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the District of Washington re-
fused to enforce a forum selection clause selecting the courts of Ger-
many because the contract contained provisions enforceable under 
German law that would reduce the defendant’s obligations to the 
plaintiff below what COGSA guaranteed.83 
To be sure, not every U.S. court presented with arguments under 
section 3(8) has declined to enforce a foreign forum selection clause. 
There are a number of cases where the courts have enforced these 
 
 77 See Nippon Fire & Marine Ins. v. M/V Spring Wave, 92 F. Supp. 2d 574, 
577 (E.D. La. 2000). 
 78 See id.; see also Kanematsu USA, Inc. v. M/V Ocean Sunrise, No. Civ.A. 
01–1702, 2003 WL 21241790, at *5 (E.D. La. May 23, 2003) (declining to en-
force Japanese forum selection clause on the basis of section 3(8) of COGSA); 
Union Steel Am. Co. v. M/V Sanko Spruce, No. CIV.A. 97–5696(JEI), 1998 WL 
531824, at *2–4 (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 1998) (declining to enforce South Korean forum 
selection clause on the basis of section 3(8) of COGSA). 
 79 See Nippon Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 92 F. Supp. 2d at 477. 
 80 See Cent. Nat’l-Gottesman, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 2d at 679. 
 81 Id. at 681. 
 82 See id. 
 83 See Y-Tex Corp. v. Schenker, Inc., No. C10-1264 RSL, 2011 WL 
2292352, at *7–8 (W.D. Wash. June 8, 2011); see also Heli-Lift Ltd. v. M/V 
OOCL FAITH, No. CV 00-13191 GAF(CWX), 2001 WL 34084370, at *1, 7–8 
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2001) (declining to enforce German forum selection clause 
on the basis of section 3(8) of COGSA). 
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clauses in situations where in rem actions were unavailable in the 
chosen forum.84 In none of these cases, however, did the foreign law 
expressly limit the plaintiff’s recovery to a sum below that guaran-
teed by COGSA.85 Accordingly, even the results in these cases are 
consistent with the argument that a party may not rely on foreign 
forum selection clauses as a backdoor way of obtaining results oth-
erwise prohibited by U.S. law. 
IV. CRITIQUING MYHRA 
The facts of Myhra are straightforward.86 Myhra, a resident of 
England, traveled to Miami, Florida, in 2009 to go on a cruise oper-
ated by Royal Caribbean.87 While at sea, Myhra became ill and was 
diagnosed with Legionnaire’s Disease.88 He subsequently died as a 
result of his illness.89 His estate brought a negligence action against 
Royal Caribbean in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of Florida.90 Royal Caribbean moved to dismiss the suit on the basis 
of a forum selection clause in the passenger contract requiring liti-
gation to be brought in England.91 That contract also contained a 
choice-of-law clause stating that it would be governed by English 
law.92 
 
 84 See Liberty Woods Int’l, Inc. v. M.V. Ocean Quartz, 889 F.3d 127, 133 (3d 
Cir. 2018) (concluding that inability to proceed in rem was not sufficient to re-
quire the court to set aside the forum selection clause on public policy grounds); 
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. MV DSR Atlantic, 131 F.3d 1336, 1339–40 (9th Cir. 
1997) (same); see also Glyphics Media, Inc. v. M.V. Conti Singapore, No. 02 Civ. 
4398(NRB), 2003 WL 1484145, at *4 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 21, 2003) (rejecting plain-
tiff’s argument that long delays in Indian courts provided a basis for invalidating 
Indian forum selection clause because Plaintiff failed to meet the burden of proof). 
 85 See Jewel Seafoods Ltd. v. M/V Peace River, 39 F. Supp. 2d 628, 631, 633 
(D.S.C. 1999) (concluding that plaintiff had “failed to demonstrate that China’s 
substantive law would reduce the carrier’s obligations to the cargo owner below 
what COGSA guarantees” and enforcing forum selection clause). 
 86 See Estate of Myhra v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1233, 1236 
(11th Cir. 2012). 
 87 See id. 
 88 See id. 
 89 See id. 
 90 See id. 
 91 See id. at 1236–37. 
 92 See id. at 1239. 
2021] CRUISE CONTRACTS 1105 
 
England was at that time a party to the Athens Convention.93 
This Convention imposes liability caps for cruise ship operators 
with respect to claims brought by passengers.94 At the time that 
Myhra was decided in 2012, this cap was set at roughly $73,000.95 
In 2014, the United Kingdom ratified the 2002 Protocol to the Ath-
ens Convention that raised the cap.96 Under the new Protocol, the 
cap is now set at roughly $568,000.97 
Myhra’s estate argued that the forum selection clause in the 
cruise contract was void on public policy grounds.98 Specifically, 
the estate argued that Congress had enacted a statute—46 U.S.C. 
§ 30509—which invalidates any contract provision that limits the 
liability of a cruise ship operator transporting passengers through a 
U.S. port with respect to certain types of claims.99 That statute pro-
vides: 
(1) In general.—The owner . . . of a vessel transport-
ing passengers between ports in the United States or 
between a port in the United States and a port in a 
foreign country, may not include in a . . . contract a 
provision limiting— 
 
 93 See Peltz, supra note 2, at 519. 
 94 See id. at 492. 
 95 See id. at 504. 
 96 Maria Pittordis & Zoe Triantafyllou, Athens Protocol 2002 in Force from 
23 April 2014 for Ratifying States, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 23, 2014), https://www.lex-
ology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=aae7be2d-460a-41d9-b9f8-143bb7207692. As 
of March 2021, thirty-one states are parties to the Athens Protocol 2002. Protocol 
of 2002 to the Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and 
Their Luggage by Sea, 1974, U.N. TREATY SYS., https://treaties.
un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=080000028053bf55&clang=_en (last vis-
ited May 15, 2021) [hereinafter 2002 Athens Protocol Parties]. Twenty-seven 
states are parties to the original incarnation of the Athens Convention that was 
finalized in 1974. Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and 
Their Luggage by Sea, 1974, U.N. TREATY SYS., https://treaties.un.org/
Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002800cdbb3 (last visited May 15, 2021). 
 97 See Peltz, supra note 2. Due to changes in foreign exchange rates, the cap 
under the original Athens Convention is now set at roughly $66,000. 
 98 See Estate of Myhra v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1233, 1236 
(11th Cir. 2012). 
 99 See id. 
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(A) the liability of the owner . . . for personal in-
jury or death caused by the negligence or fault of 
the owner or the owner’s employees or 
agents . . . . 
(2) Voidness.--A provision described in paragraph 
(1) is void.100 
The statute is a close cousin to COGSA section 3(8).101 The key 
difference is that while section 3(8) applies to the transportation of 
cargo, section 30509 applies to the transportation of passengers.102 
The estate argued that since an English court would enforce the Eng-
lish choice-of-law clause and apply the limitations set forth in the 
Athens Convention—which at the time capped the liability of cruise 
ship companies with respect to passenger claims at around 
$73,000—the forum selection clause naming England as the exclu-
sive forum was void as against U.S. public policy as expressed in 
section 30509.103 
The estate’s arguments were sound. As discussed above, there 
are many state and federal court cases where the courts refused to 
enforce forum selection clauses in reliance on similar arguments. On 
the plaintiff’s telling, Congress enacted a statute that invalidated any 
contract clause “limiting” the liability of a cruise ship company for 
injuries suffered by passengers.104 If the company had written lan-
guage into its contract stating that its liability to its passenger was 
capped at $73,000, it would have been struck down.105 To allow the 
company to obtain the exact same result via the use of a choice-of-
law clause and a forum selection clause, the estate argued, was con-
trary to the clear intent of the statute.106 
 
 100 46 U.S.C. § 305609(a) (emphasis added). 
 101 Compare 46 U.S.C. § 30509, with 46 U.S.C. § 30701. 
 102 Compare 46 U.S.C. § 30509, with 46 U.S.C. § 30701. 
 103 See Estate of Myhra, 695 F.3d at 1242. 
 104 Id. at 1237–38, 1242. 
 105 See Johnson v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 449 F. App’x 846, 847–48 
(11th Cir. 2011) (citing section 30509 to invalidate express liability waiver in 
contract); see also Boutwell, supra note 10, at 550 (noting that cruise companies 
rewrote their passenger contracts in the wake of Ninth Circuit decision invalidat-
ing attempt to impose limitations on their liability by expressly referencing the 
Athens Convention). 
 106 See 46 U.S.C. § 30509; see also Boutwell, supra note 10, at 550. 
2021] CRUISE CONTRACTS 1107 
 
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s argument.107 It held 
that the forum selection clause was enforceable, ruled for the de-
fendants, and ordered the case dismissed in favor of an English fo-
rum.108 In justifying this conclusion, the court advanced four sepa-
rate arguments. 
A. Express Liability Waivers Are Different than Choice-of-
Law Clauses 
The court stated that “[t]he danger presented by a ship owner’s 
unilateral imposition of a limitation on liability is decidedly differ-
ent from that posed by a valid choice-of-law clause.”109 On this is-
sue, the court is simply incorrect. If the enforcement of a choice-of-
law clause will lead directly to a limitation on the liability of the 
owner, then the dangers posed by such a clause are precisely the 
same as those posed by the owner’s unilateral imposition of a limi-
tation via an express contract provision.110 
B. There Is No Specific Reference to Forum Selection Clauses 
in Section 30509 
The court observed that neither section 30509 nor its legislative 
history contains any specific reference to forum selection clauses.111 
In light of this fact, the court questioned whether it would be “ap-
propriate to extend the scope of the statute to cover forum-selection 
clauses.”112 It noted that “[a] prudential respect for the prerogatives 
of the political branches counsels that we not infer a statutory limi-
tation on such devices absent an explicit exercise of congressional 
judgment.”113 Ultimately, the court decided that the “appropriate 
course is to interpret the statute to its plain language unless Con-
gress, by appropriate amendment, makes policy choices on the 
 
 107 See Estate of Myhra, 695 F.3d at 1246–47. 
 108 See id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 
2012: Twenty-Sixth Annual Survey, 61 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 217, 248 (2013). 
 111 See Estate of Myhra, 695 F.3d at 1243–44. 
 112 Id. at 1244. 
 113 See id. 
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contours of choice-of-forum clauses that involve the Country’s in-
ternational commercial relationship.”114 
In advancing this argument, the court made no mention of 
Mitsubishi. In that case, it will be recalled, the Supreme Court stated 
that “in the event the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses op-
erated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue 
statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little hes-
itation in condemning the agreement as against public policy.”115 
Nor did the court discuss the dozens of cases referenced above 
where state and federal courts relied on the logic of anti-waiver to 
invalidate forum selection clauses as a backdoor way of enforcing 
choice-of-law clauses that violate public policy.116 Since the Elev-
enth Circuit failed to discuss any of these cases, we have no way of 
knowing whether it believes that they were wrongly decided. This 
failure to engage with dozens of contrary decisions—virtually all of 
which involved statutes which likewise contain no express reference 
to forum selection clauses—casts doubt on the soundness of the 
Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning.117 
 
 114 See id. 
 115 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
637 n.19 (1985). 
 116 See supra notes 47–85 (collecting cases). 
 117 Even if this were not the case, the forum selection clause in Myhra is argu-
ably invalid under a plain language reading of section 30509. That statute states 
that any “provision limiting . . . the liability of the owner . . . for personal injury 
or death” shall be “void.” 46 U.S.C. § 30509. The forum selection clause in Myhra 
is a “provision” which, if enforced, will ultimately result in “limiting . . . the lia-
bility of the owner” via the application of the Athens Convention by the English 
court. Id.; see Estate of Myhra, 695 F.3d at 1242. In light of this fact, the absence 
of any language in the statute specifically referencing forum selection clauses is 
immaterial. There is also a textual argument that the forum selection clause here 
at issue is invalid under a different part of section 30509. That statute also forbids 
cruise ship owners from writing provisions into their contract that “limit . . . the 
right of a claimant for personal injury or death to a trial by court of competent 
jurisdiction.” 46 U.S.C. § 30509. There is no question that a federal court in Flor-
ida is a court of “competent jurisdiction” within the meaning of the statute. There 
is also no question that the forum selection clause “limits” the right of the plaintiff 
to bring suit in those courts by mandating an English forum. This reading of the 
statute is, however, probably foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Car-
nival Cruise that adopted a different interpretation of the statutory text. See Car-
nival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 596 (1991) (“By its plain language, the 
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C. English Law Provides Similar Protections to U.S. Law 
The Myhra court also considered what would happen if the fo-
rum selection clause were enforced and the suit proceeded in Eng-
land.118 It acknowledged that an English court will generally “apply 
its own law or enforce the choice-of-law clause of the contract.”119 
It further acknowledged that the English courts are likely to give 
effect to the liability limitations imposed by the Athens Conven-
tion.120 The court did not, however, view this outcome as troubling 
because the English courts “would be proceeding along a path not 
that different from the course a U.S. court would follow.”121 The 
court explained that “other provisions of federal law, specifically the 
Death on the High Seas Act, would have limited [the plaintiff’s] re-
covery.”122 Since the Athens Convention and the Death on the High 
Seas Act both limit the plaintiff’s recovery in some manner, the 
court reasoned, there is no meaningful difference between the law 
of England and the law of the United States in this area and, hence, 
no reason not to enforce the forum selection clause.123 
While the Eleventh Circuit was correct that the Death on the 
High Seas Act limits a plaintiff’s recovery to pecuniary damages, it 
was incorrect in its observation that this rule is “not that different” 
from the liability limitations set forth in the Athens Convention.124 
The Athens Convention, as discussed above, imposes a fixed dam-
ages cap on any passenger tort claim brought against a cruise ship 
company.125 The Death on the High Seas Act provides that a tort 
 
forum-selection clause before us does not take away respondents’ right to ‘a trial 
by [a] court of competent jurisdiction’ and thereby contravene the explicit pro-
scription of § 183c. Instead, the clause states specifically that actions arising out 
of the passage contract shall be brought ‘if at all,’ in a court ‘located in the State 
of Florida,’ which, plainly, is a ‘court of competent jurisdiction’ within the mean-
ing of the statute.”). 
 118 See Estate of Myhra, 695 F.3d at 1243. 
 119 Id. 
 120 See id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. at 1243–44. 
 123 See id. 
 124 See 46 U.S.C. § 30303 (“The recovery in an action under this chapter shall 
be a fair compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained by the individuals for 
whose benefit the action is brought.” (emphasis added)); Estate of Myhra, 695 
F.3d at 1243. 
 125 See Estate of Myhra, 695 F.3d at 1237–38. 
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plaintiff can recover only certain types of damages—pecuniary dam-
ages—but does not cap the overall recovery.126 A liability regime 
that limits the type of damages allowed is obviously very different 
from a liability regime that caps the allowable damages at a set num-
ber. It is also important to note that the Death on the High Seas Act 
applies only when there is a death on the high seas.127 If a person 
suffers a non-fatal injury on a cruise ship, the Act is inapplicable.128 
The liability limitations imposed by the Athens Convention, by con-
trast, apply to all personal injury claims regardless of whether they 
result in the plaintiff’s demise.129 
There is, however, a more fundamental problem with the court’s 
analysis. The language of section 30509 makes clear that U.S. law 
is meant to provide a baseline against which to measure the effect 
of a contract provision limiting the cruise ship company’s liabil-
ity.130 If the contract provision seeks to limit the carrier’s liability in 
a manner beyond what is permissible under U.S. law, in other words, 
it is void on public policy grounds.131 Rather than looking to the 
Death on the High Seas Act as a baseline, the court used the mere 
existence of the Death on the High Seas Act to justify its conclusion 
that liability limitations in the Athens Convention do not violate 
U.S. public policy.132 We do not know how much Myhra’s estate 
would have been able to recover under the Death on the High Seas 
Act and, consequently, we have no way of knowing if this amount 
is more or less than the amount the estate could recover under the 
 
 126 See 46 U.S.C. § 30303. The impact of limiting liability to pecuniary losses 
will vary depending on the plaintiff. The estates of children and retirees will re-
cover less. The estates of high-income workers in the prime of life will recover 
more. 
 127 See 46 U.S.C. § 30303. 
 128 It is not clear from the facts recounted by either the district court or the 
court of appeals whether Myhra died from Legionnaire’s Disease while on board 
the ship or after he returned to shore. It would appear, however, that the precise 
location of his death is immaterial. The Fifth Circuit has held that “DOHSA also 
confers jurisdiction if the decedent is on the high seas at the time he suffers his 
mortal injury” even if the decedent’s final moments actually occur on land. Motts 
v. M/V Green Wave, 210 F.3d 565, 569 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 129 See Peltz, supra note 2, at 491–92. 
 130 See 46 U.S.C. § 30509. 
 131 See Coyle & Richardson, supra note 20, at 17. 
 132 See Estate of Myhra v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1233, 
1243–44 (11th Cir. 2012). 
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Athens Convention. Without this information, there is no way to tell 
whether enforcing the English forum selection clause would have 
violated U.S. public policy. 
What the court should have done was determine the best-case 
damages scenario for the plaintiff under the Death on the High Seas 
Act and any other relevant provisions of U.S. law. The court should 
have then compared the number to the cap set by the Athens Con-
vention. If the best-case scenario under U.S. law exceeded the cap, 
it should have refused to enforce the foreign forum selection clause. 
If this best-case scenario fell below the cap, the court should have 
enforced the clause. Unfortunately, the Myhra court never under-
took this analysis. Instead, it offered conclusory assertions that U.S. 
law and English law are not really all that different without under-
taking a more searching analysis.133 
D. International Comity Counsels Against Enforcement 
The court’s final argument was that the forum selection clause 
should be enforced because such provisions play a “very significant 
role” in “the maintenance of the present international legal order.”134 
The court noted that these clauses “allow the courts of the United 
States to respect not only the rights and expressed preferences of 
nationals of other countries, but also to respect the ability of other 
national jurisdictions to adjudicate disputes.”135 It would be inap-
propriate, in the court’s view, to “prevent another sovereign from 
applying its substantive policy choices to a case involving its own 
nationals and its internal commercial relationships.”136 
There are two problems with this argument. First, irrespective of 
the role that such clauses play in the maintenance of the international 
order, the Supreme Court has made clear that forum selection 
clauses should not be enforced “if enforcement would contravene a 
strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought, whether 
declared by statute or by judicial decision.”137 Section 30509 clearly 
states the public policy of the United States.138 The suit was brought 
 
 133 See id. at 1243. 
 134 Id. at 1244. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972). 
 138 See 46 U.S.C. § 30509. 
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in the United States. Accordingly, the general rule that forum selec-
tion clauses are presumptively enforceable must cede the field even 
if non-enforcement of the clause would offend traditional notions of 
international comity. 
Second, the United States has an interest in applying its law to 
this case because the voyage in question began and ended in Miami, 
Florida.139 Section 30509 expressly regulates the terms of passenger 
agreements where a vessel is “transporting passengers between ports 
in the United States, or between a port in the United States and a 
port in a foreign country.”140 Since this voyage satisfied the statutory 
criteria, the court should not have concerned itself overmuch with 
the general notions of international comity. Instead, it should have 
faithfully applied the statute as written by Congress and applied sec-
tion 30509 to a cruise contract involving a voyage that began and 
ended at a U.S. port.141 
V. THE AFTERMATH OF MYHRA 
In the decade since Myhra was decided, district courts within the 
Eleventh Circuit have cited it to uphold a foreign forum selection 
clause on three occasions. A careful review of these decisions re-
veals that none of the flaws in the Myhra decision have been ad-
dressed. Indeed, the reasoning in these subsequent decisions is in 
many ways even more problematic than the reasoning in Myhra. 
In Lebedinsky v. MSC Cruises, S.A., the Eleventh Circuit upheld 
a district court decision enforcing a forum selection clause in a 
cruise contract requiring all disputes to be resolved in the courts of 
Naples, Italy.142 Italy has ratified the Athens Convention143 and the 
contract in question contained an Italian choice-of-law clause.144 
Citing Myhra, the Eleventh Circuit held in Lebedinsky that there was 
no public policy reason why the Italian forum selection clause 
should not be enforced.145 The court reasoned that “Congress’s 
 
 139 Estate of Myhra, 695 F.3d at 1236. 
 140 46 U.S.C. § 30509. 
 141 Estate of Myhra, 695 F.3d at 1236, 1244. 
 142 Lebedinsky v. MSC Cruises, S.A., 789 F. App’x 196, 198 (11th Cir. 2019). 
 143 See 2002 Athens Protocol Parties, supra note 96 (listing European Union 
as a party that ratified 2002 Athens Protocol). 
 144 See Lebedinsky, 789 F. App’x at 199. 
 145 Id. at 203. 
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opposition to liability limitation provisions ‘was to forbid the uni-
lateral imposition of a limitation of liability by a ship owner without 
any recourse to judicial process.’”146 Accordingly, the Lebedinsky 
court concluded that “[t]his policy concern does not extend to forum 
selection clauses because forum selection clauses merely direct a 
dispute to a particular jurisdiction.”147 
This argument is flawed for the reasons outlined in Part IV. 
When the enforcement of a foreign forum selection clause will in-
evitably lead to the imposition of a liability limitation expressly pro-
hibited by the plain text of section 30509, the logic of anti-waiver 
compels the conclusion that the clause should not be enforced. To 
do otherwise is to allow cruise companies to utilize choice-of-law 
clauses and forum selection clauses in tandem to effectuate a result 
that is expressly prohibited by a federal statute. There is no evidence 
that Congress, in enacting section 30509, wished to facilitate work-
arounds of this sort. 
To its credit, the Myhra court acknowledged this fact, even 
though it ultimately concluded that the forum selection clause 
should be enforced because the limitations imposed by the Athens 
Convention were similar to those imposed by the Death on the High 
Seas Act.148 The Lebedinsky court, to its discredit, never engaged 
with this issue. This oversight is all the more troubling because the 
plaintiff in Lebedinsky was alive at the time the suit was brought, 
thereby rendering the Death on the High Seas Act inapplicable.149 
Since the new contract selected the law and courts of Italy, the Leb-
edinsky court should have also conducted a thorough comparative 
analysis of U.S. and Italian law. It did not. Instead, it cited to a prior 
case involving a dead plaintiff and English contract clauses to re-
solve a case involving a live plaintiff and Italian contract clauses. 
This analysis is difficult to defend. 
If the Lebedinsky court conducted a proper analysis, moreover, 
it would be difficult to see how the defendant could have prevailed. 
The plaintiff asserted that she had suffered more than $750,000 in 
 
 146 Id. (citing Estate of Myhra, 695 F.3d at 1243). The phrase “recourse to 
judicial process” does not appear in section 30509.  
 147 Id. 
 148 Estate of Myhra, 695 F.3d at 1243–44. 
 149 See Lebedinsky, 789 F. App’x at 198. 
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damages.150 If this is correct, then applying the damages cap im-
posed by the 2002 Protocol to the Athens Convention would guar-
antee that she would recover only a portion of her losses (roughly 
$568,000).151 Such an outcome is irreconcilable with section 
30509.152 
The great irony in Lebedinsky is that there was a simple argu-
ment—which went completely unaddressed by the court—for ruling 
against the plaintiff. As noted above, section 30509 applies only by 
its terms when the cruise ship is transporting passengers to or from 
a U.S. port.153 The cruise ship in Lebedinsky never stopped at a U.S. 
port.154 Instead, it “started in Venice, Italy, made several stops in 
Italy, Greece, and Montenegro, and then terminated back in Ven-
ice.”155 Since the ship never put in at a U.S. port, section 30509 was 
inapplicable by its terms. This fact alone should have allowed the 
court to dismiss the plaintiff’s argument that the Italian forum selec-
tion clause was void on public policy grounds without any need to 
rely on Myhra.156 At no point in its decision, however, did the Leb-
edinsky court make this connection. Instead, it cited Myhra for the 
dubious proposition that enforcing foreign forum selection clauses 
that will lead to the imposition of liability caps is fully consistent 
with U.S. public policy.157 
The record of the district courts in the Eleventh Circuit is no 
more distinguished. In Turner v. Costa Crociere S.P.A., the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida cited Myhra 
for the proposition that “the Eleventh Circuit held that § 30509 does 
not prohibit forum-selection clauses that require litigation be 
 
 150 Id. at 202. 
 151 See supra note 8 (outlining caps related to 2002 Protocol to the Athens 
Convention). 
 152 See 46 U.S.C. § 30509. 
 153 See Peltz, supra note 2, at 491, 496–97. 
 154 Lebedinsky, 789 F. App’x at 198. 
 155 Lebedinsky v. MSC Cruises, S.A., No. 18-cv-62522-UU, 2019 WL 
9467673, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 8, 2019). 
 156 See Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 834 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(“The parties do not dispute that the Grand Princess voyage upon which plaintiff 
and her husband sailed did not touch a United States port. Thus, the terms of 
§ 183c(a) [the predecessor statute to section 30509] plainly do not apply to the 
Passage Contract of plaintiff’s cruise.”). 
 157 Lebedinsky, 789 F. App’x at 203–04. 
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brought in a foreign jurisdiction.”158 In Carrington v. NCL (Baha-
mas) Ltd., the same court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the 
foreign forum selection clause was unenforceable on the grounds 
that it had been “squarely dealt with and rejected by the Eleventh 
Circuit in Estate of Myhra.”159 At no point in either case did the 
court consider whether the factual differences between the injuries 
suffered by the plaintiffs and the plaintiff in Myhra might be rele-
vant. At no point in either case did the court consider whether the 
laws of the chosen forum were different from the relevant U.S. 
laws.160  
CONCLUSION 
The way forward for the Eleventh Circuit is clear. It should re-
visit its decision in Myhra and adopt a new framework for evaluat-
ing the relationship between foreign forum selection clauses and 
section 30509. 
First, the Eleventh Circuit should adopt a rule that a foreign fo-
rum selection clause in a cruise passenger contract is presumptively 
unenforceable when the contract contains a choice-of-law clause se-
lecting a jurisdiction that has ratified the Athens Convention. This 
presumption is appropriate because the enforcement of the forum 
selection clause in this context will in many cases lead to the impo-
sition of a liability cap in contravention of section 30509. Second, 
the court should offer the defendant the opportunity to rebut this 
presumption by showing that the damages potentially recoverable 
by the plaintiff in a best-case scenario under U.S. law would fall 
below the liability cap. If the defendant can prove that the damages 
under U.S. law will be less than the limits imposed by the Athens 
Convention, the foreign forum selection clause should be enforced. 
If the defendant cannot make this showing, the clause should be 
 
 158 Turner v. Costa Crociere S.P.A., 488 F. Supp. 3d 1240, 1249 (S.D. Fla. 
2020). 
 159 Carrington v. NCL (Bah.) Ltd., No. 10-25166-CIV, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
76363, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 2020). In Turner, the cruise ship at issue also 
never put in at a U.S. port. See Turner, 488 F. Supp. 3d at 1250. Section 30509 
was therefore inapplicable by its terms and the case could have been resolved on 
this basis alone. 
 160 See Turner, 488 F. Supp. 3d at 1246–57; Carrington, 2020 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 76363, at *4. 
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deemed unenforceable, and litigation may continue in the United 
States. 
There is no question that this approach imposes a heavy burden 
on the defendant. It will frequently be difficult for the cruise com-
pany to prove a plaintiff’s best-case scenario with respect to dam-
ages falls below the liability cap at the motion-to-dismiss stage. 
Nevertheless, this approach represents the only practicable way for 
the courts to give effect to the statement of public policy contained 
in section 30509. To hold otherwise would be to allow the cruise 
companies to use a combination of choice-of-law clauses and forum 
selection clauses to achieve an end that is flatly prohibited by federal 
law—the limitation of cruise ship company liability via contract 
when a cruise ship passenger suffers injury or death as a result of 
negligence on the part of the company or its agents.161 
 
 161 After this Article was substantially complete, the author was engaged to 
provide legal advice and support to an attorney suing a cruise company on behalf 
of a foreign passenger. The case ultimately settled before trial. 
